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REGULATION OF MEDICAL EXPERT SYSTEMS:
A NECESSARY EVIL?

I.

INTRODUCTION

For years, scientists have anticipated that computerized
medical devices will replace humans in providing medical diagnoses.1 Popular culture has furthered this anticipation.
For example, space travelers in Star Trek used a computer
device to examine and diagnose a fellow traveler's illness.2
Whether or not these medical diagnostic devices will be made
reliable enough to replace humans completely remains to be
seen. Currently, there are commercially available interactive
"knowledge-based" computer software applications designed
to assist doctors in the medical diagnostic process. 3 These
software programs are known as medical expert systems
(MESs) and are becoming more widely available. 4 A telephone dial-up MES has been available for doctors through
the American Medical Association's AMA/Net since 1987. 5
MESs are now even available for stand-alone desktop microcomputers (PC and Macintosh).6 These trends suggest that
MESs will soon be available to patients in their own homes
through personal computer and dial-up service.
While MESs allow medical diagnosis with the touch of a
finger, the widespread use of medical expert systems carries
the risk of product-caused injuries to users. The most obvious danger of patient at-home use is incorrect diagnoses by
MESs, resulting in patients who improperly treat their ailment. This danger will be a great concern if MESs are used
by patients without doctor supervision, as may be the case in
the near future. Confronted with this prospect, the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) has considered imposing regula1. See Richard A. Shortliffe, Computer Programsto Support Clinical Decision Making, 258 JAMA 61, 62 (1987).

2. Id. at 61.
3. Id. at 61-64. See also Becky Batcha, Diagnosis with the Touch of a Finger, COMPUTER WORLD, Jan. 18, 1988, at 64, 64-66.

4. See Batcha, supra note 3, at 64.
5. See id.
6. Bryan Bergeron, ILIAD: A Diagnostic Consultant and PatientSimulator, 8 MD COMPUTING 46, 46 (1991); Shortliffe, supra note 1, at 64.
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tions on MESs to supplement existing product liability law.'
While product safety regulation may protect users, the long
delay of the agency review process may inhibit innovations
and discourage developments in this growing industry.
This comment addresses the issue of whether medical expert systems should be regulated by the FDA. More specifically, the comment discusses why MES regulation is necessary notwithstanding the availability of product liability law
to safeguard public safety and despite the adverse effects that
regulation may have on the development of MESs.8 In addition, the strengths and weaknesses of the current regulatory
scheme for medical devices is also examined in order to devise a more effective and efficient regulatory scheme for
MESs.9
As background information, the comment discusses the
current FDA regulatory scheme for medical devices, more
particularly, computer-controlled medical devices. 10 The
analysis section of the comment addresses the competing policies related to this issue, such as the need for regulation and
the undesirable effects of regulation." One of the more interesting but undesirable effects of regulation is the infringement of First Amendment rights of freedom of speech. Like
medical textbooks, MESs disseminate information of scientific value. As such, this dissemination of information constithat is protected under the First
tutes communication
2
Amendment.'
The comment proposes that MESs not be regulated at
this time due to their limited availability and the intervention of physicians in using MESs.13 The comment also proposes modifications to the current FDA scheme to make it
more applicable to MESs.14 Finally, the comment proposes
an alternate regulatory scheme that regulates both MES
7. See Richard A. Beutel, Government Regulation of DiagnosticSoftware:
A Threat to Artificial Intelligence Software Developers, 2 THE COMPUTER LAW.
22, 22 (1985).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 201-240.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 242-278.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 130-180.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 184-240.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 229-240.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 290-291.
14. See discussion infra part V.
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users and developers, as compared to the current product-oriented FDA scheme.'"

II.

BACKGROUND

A. Artificial Intelligence
The term "artificial intelligence" (AI) brings to mind
Hollywood's images of the thinking computer in 2001, A
Space Odyssey and the killer android in The Terminator.
While such movies present images of AI with incredible and
horrific capabilities, at this time AI capabilities are far more
6
modest.'
Currently, most AI systems are based on a formal logic
approach.' 7 This approach uses logic symbols to represent
knowledge. These symbols are structured and manipulated
sequentially to mimic human deductive processes.'
With
this approach, AI systems are most successful in proving
straightforward mathematical theorems. 19 AI systems, however, do not achieve the same level of success when it comes
to real-world problems.2 ° The lack of success that the formal
logic approach has had in duplicating "the richness of the
human deductive process " " may be attributed partly to the
rigidity and precision required in the implementation of that
approach. Because formal logic represents the world in concrete symbols that are manipulated to produce inferences,
this approach is not as effective in real-world problems that
involve abstract and incomplete knowledge.2 2 Indeed, there
are general common-sense tasks that are intuitively easy for
humans but difficult for Al, such as the ability to recognize
15. See infra text accompanying notes 292-293.

16. See COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND Soc'Y, BENEFITS AND RISKS OF KNOWLEDGE-BASED SYSTEMS 4 (1989) [hereinafter COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND SOC'Y];
NIGEL BRYANT, MANAGING EXPERT SYSTEMS 2-3 (1988).
17. See Beutel, supra note 7, at 23. See also ELAINE RICH, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 1-4 (1983); David L. Waltz, The Prospectsfor Building Truly Intelligent
Machines, in THE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE DEBATE: FALSE STARTS, REAL FOUNDATIONS 191, 193-94 (Stephen R. Graubard ed., 1989).
18. See Beutel, supra note 7, at 22-23.
19. COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND SoC'Y, supra note 16, at 4; RICH, supra note

17, at 2.
20. Beutel, supra note 7, at 23 (quoting Douglas Lenat, Computer Software
for Intelligent Systems, ScI. AM., Sept. 1984, at 204).
21. Id.
22. Id.; COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND Soc'Y, supra note 16, at 4.
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faces, patterns, or words.2 3 The reason that AI has difficulty
with these seemingly mundane tasks stems from the fact that
it is difficult to program a machine to understand an abstract
concept. 2 4 Currently, none of the existing AI systems contain
more than a small fraction of the common-sense knowledge
possessed by the average human.2 5 Thus, despite having the
ability to perform mathematical calculations millions of times
faster than humans, present-day Al systems lack the true capability to reason and grasp abstract and common-sense con26
cepts (e.g., shape, time, liquids, the beliefs of others, etc.).
While the present AI approach is not well suited for general-purpose domains, it performs admirably in specialized
and self-contained domains. The success of AI in performing
specialized tasks has led AI researchers to concentrate on expert systems.
1. Expert Systems
By definition, an expert system is an interactive computer program that uses knowledge stored in a data base 28 to
provide solutions and explanations to questions in a narrow
23. Andy Johnson-Laird, Neural Networks: The Next Intellectual Property
Nightmare?, 7 THE COMPUTER LAw. 7 (1990).

24. Id.
25. COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE

AND

Soc'Y, supra note 16, at 4. In an effort to

better simulate human mental processes, a second AI approach, neural networks, was developed. Unlike the traditional AI approach, which tries to duplicate mental processes through the use of symbolic logic, neural networks try to
duplicate mental processes by mimicking the way the brain functions. The theory behind this approach is that a machine will function like a brain if it has the
same physical features as the brain. Neural networks, therefore, are made up
of connected artificial neurons modeled after the human neurons. As a result,
the learning process of neural networks resembles that of humans. A neural
network learns through simple repetition and constant correction. See John-

son-Laird, supra note 23, at 7-8; see also Donald L. Wenskay, NeuralNetworks:
A Prescriptionfor Effective Protection, 8 THE COMPUTER LAw. 12 (1991). For an
interesting discussion of the connection between neuroscience and artificial intelligence, see Jacob T. Schwartz, The New Connectionism: Developing Relationships Between Neuroscience and Artificial Intelligence, in THE ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE DEBATE: FALSE STARTS, REAL FOUNDATIONS,

supra note 17, at

123.
26. COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE

AND Soc'Y, supra note 16, at 4.
27. Id.; BRYANT, supra note 16, at 2-3.
28. A data base is defined as a computer repository of interrelated data

where rapid search and retrieval of data can be made by users. JAMES MARTIN,
PRINCIPLES OF DATA-BASE MANAGEMENT 1-4 (1976).
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and specific area. 2 9 In other words, an expert system attempts to transform the knowledge and problem-solving process of a human expert into a machine-recognizable format so
that they can be processed by a computer program.3 0 An expert system generally consists of four distinct parts: (1) a
knowledge base that is updated during a consultation; (2) a
set of rules that operates on the facts; (3) an inference system
that chooses the rules by making the necessary connections
and conclusions; and (4) an explanation facility that explains
the system's decision to the user. 3 1 Other common characteristics of expert systems include the ability to deal with uncertainty 32 and the use of "heuristics. '33 Heuristics are rules
that operate to increasingly narrow the program's search
each step of the way.3 4 As such, they are used to reduce the
system's search time. At the same time, the ability to deal
with uncertainty is an important feature in MESs, because
medical information provided by patients is often incomplete
to the point of being unreliable. 5 In order to manage this
uncertainty, some expert systems have adopted a ranking
scheme based on probabilistic (or statistical) analysis. 6
Expert systems have been developed and used in areas
such as medicine, law, business, education, and the military.3 7 Until now, most of these expert systems were developed by research laboratories or industrial organizations for
internal use.3 In the past few years, interest in AI and expert systems has grown rapidly. The growing amount of research at academic and research institutions, along with the
increased sales of hardware supporting the preferred artifi29. COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND SoC'Y, supra note 16, at 4-5; BRYANT, supra
note 16, at 2-3.
30. COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND SoC'Y, supra note 16, at 5.
31. Id. at 6-8; BRYANT,supra note 16, at 9-10.
32. COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND Soc'Y,supra note 16, at 8-9; Shortliffe, supra
note 1, at 63. Uncertainty may be caused by a lack of complete information or
definite knowledge. See COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND SoC'Y, supra note 16, at 8-9.

33. Beutel, supra note 7, at 23.
34. Id.; see also RICH, supra note 17, at 35. In other words, a heuristic is a
technique that improves the efficiency of a search process by focusing the

search on areas that are most likely to provide a solution. Beutel, supra note 7,
at 23. See also Waltz,.supra note 17, at 194.
35. COUNCIL FOR
36. Id. at 9; G. 0.
Support System, 258
37. COUNCIL FOR

38. Id.

SCIENCE AND SoC'Y, supra note 16, at 8.
Barnett et al., DXplain:An Evolving DiagnosticDecisionJAMA 67, 72 (1987).
SCIENCE AND Soc'y, supra note 16, at 15.
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cial intelligence programming language LISP, 39 are clear indications that the level of interest in expert systems has increased steadily over the past few years.
In medicine, expert systems have found relatively widespread use as tools in both education and practice.4" Medical
expert systems are currently being used as teaching tools at a
number of leading research hospitals across the country.4 1 A
dial-in telephone diagnostic expert system, DXplain, has been
available to doctors through the American Medical Association's AMA/Net since 1987.42 Moreover, three medical expert
systems are now commercially available on stand-alone PCbased or Macintosh micro-computers.4 3 The users' response
to these systems is very enthusiastic. 4 Given these facts, a
medical expert system for common illnesses may soon be
available to the general public, either through dial-up services or on stand-alone micro-computers.
Despite the fact that current technology is advanced
enough to make such a system a reality, the widespread use
of MESs ultimately rests on the issue of public safety. Given
the complexity of medical expert systems and their potential
for harm,4 5 the question is whether a patient should be allowed to interact with the expert system without the intervention of a physician.
2.

Defects in Expert Systems

Without the intervention of a doctor, the most obvious
danger presented by MESs involves injuries caused by the
patient's reliance on an inaccurate diagnosis by the expert
system, based on the patient's erroneous or incomplete input
of symptoms. 4 6 As a result of the incomplete information, it
is possible for the system to interpret symptoms given by the
patient as a cold, while the patient may actually be suffering
from pneumonia. Given the complexity of medical expert sys39. Beutel, supra note 7, at 22 & n.4.
40. Batcha, supra note 3, at 64; Bergeron, supra note 6, at 51.
41. See Bergeron, supra note 6, at 51.
42. See Batcha, supra note 3, at 64. AMA/Net is a medical information computer network that can be accessed by telephone. Id. at 66. There are approximately 8,000 doctors who currently subscribe to this service. Id. at 64.
43. See Bergeron, supra note 6, at 46; Shortliffe, supra note 1, at 64.
44. See Batcha, supra note 3, at 64; Bergeron, supra note 6, at 51.

45. See infra text accompanying notes 46-52.
46.

COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND Soc'y, supra note 16, at 8.
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tems and the user's lack of medical knowledge, it is unlikely
that the user would recognize the error.
Although patient error in characterizing his or her symptoms is the most readily imaginable danger, defects that occurred during the development of MESs may also result in an
inaccurate diagnosis. These defects may be simple typographical errors by the programmer when he inputs the
codes.4 7 Others may involve unreliable rules that generate a
wrong inference from the patient input.4 8 Another error may
occur if the program designer fails to anticipate an unusual
input by the patient and does not program the system to handle the input properly. 49 As a result, the system's reasoning
may break down if it encounters such input. Yet another defect may occur if the designer uses a rule that he or she assumes would apply in all situations, but that actually applies
only in certain situations.5 0 Finally, the user and the system
may not understand the meaning of a particular term the
same way.5 1 Such misunderstanding may also cause a defect.
Due to the subtlety of these errors, the expert system may
give the user the impression that it is functioning properly
when it is actually giving defective advice.5 2 While all expert
system developers will take every precaution to eliminate errors, it is unrealistic to expect that all systems will be free of
defects. When these defects occur, the patient may suffer an
injury as a result of the inaccurate diagnosis. For this reason, a consumer protection scheme should be established to
protect the users of MESs.5 3
3.

Legal Issues

To ensure public health and safety, the ideal consumer
protection scheme for medical devices requires a balance be55
54
tween product liability law and product safety regulation.
47. See Laurence H. Reece III, Defective Expert Systems Raise PersonalInjury Liability Issues, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 12, 1987, at 24, 25.
48. See COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND Soc'y, supra note 16, at 64.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See generally COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND SOC'Y, supra note 16, at 65
(stating that unless the MES user has sufficient medical knowledge and training, the user will not be able to distinguish between good and erroneous advice).
53. See infra text accompanying notes 54-57, 182-241.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 58-99.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 100-111.
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With regard to product liability, the choice of an appropriate
product liability theory has generated much discussion. 56 On
the other hand, the question of whether MESs should be subject to product safety regulations has not been discussed with
the same frequency. While regulation is needed to protect
public safety, it arguably inhibits innovations and slows
down development of new medical computer technology. The
resolution of the question of MES regulation will likely require a balancing of these two conflicting interests. Another
legal issue associated with MES regulation is potential infringement of free speech under the First Amendment.5 7
a. ProductLiability Law
Because of the state-of-the-art nature of MESs, there
currently exists no case law concerning which theory of liability should apply when a user injury is caused by a defective
system. Given the state-of-the-art characteristics of medical
expert systems, there are numerous viable arguments regarding which liability standards should be applied to such
systems.5 8 In general, the following product liability standards are potentially applicable to MESs: strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty. The next section presents a
brief overview of the main issues related to these liability
standards. This background is intended to help the reader
decide whether product liability law is, by itself, adequate to
protect MES users.
1)

Strict Liability

Unlike negligence, which focuses on the conduct of the
parties in assessing liability, strict liability focuses on the defective condition of the product placed in the "stream of com56. See, e.g., Marguerite E. Gerstner, Comment, Liability Issues with Artificial Intelligence Software, 33 SANrA CLARA L. REV. 239; Patrick T. Miyaki, Comment, Computer Software Defects: Should Computer Software Manufacturers
Be Held Strictly Liable for Computer Software Defects, 8 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 121 (1992).
57. At first glance, the connection between MES regulation and First
Amendment infringement appears tenuous. A closer examination of this issue,
however, reveals that MESs should be protected under the First Amendment,
as they possess scientific knowledge. See infra text accompanying notes 229241.
58. Compare Gerstner, supra note 56 (arguing that strict liability should be
applied to expert systems) with Miyaki, supra note 56 (arguing that negligence
should be applied to expert systems).
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merce" by the seller of the product.5 9 Generally, strict liability is governed by Section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts.6 0 At the moment, almost all states have adopted
Section 402A either entirely or in part.6 1 Thus, under Section
402A, recovery would be allowed only if the item causing the
injury is: (1) a product; (2) defective; and (3) placed in commerce by a seller of such product. 2
Strict liability applies only to products. To determine
whether strict liability should be applied to MESs, the key
issue is whether they are products or services. Arguably, a
medical expert system provides a service because of its intangible nature. Unlike a piece of furniture, a computer program does not have physical form and cannot be felt or
touched. 6 3 Moreover, like doctors and lawyers who are service providers, a medical expert system developer is a provider of a service because he or she is a highly skilled professional whose intellect helps to transfer the skill of a human
expert into intangible program codes. 6 4 As such, MESs are
arguably services provided by their developers. Conversely,
the packaging and marketing of computer software is no different from that of any other articles of commerce, which are
considered products by the courts.65 Additionally, computer
programs, like medical expert systems, are "moveable at the
time of identification" and therefore fit the description of
66
goods under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). While
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently set an important
59. For strict liability in tort, the issue is whether the product is defective,
not whether the defendant breached his duty of care in designing and manufacturing the product. A product is defective if it fails to meet the consumer expectancy or if its risks outweigh its benefits. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PRODUCTS
LIABILITY AND SAFETY 189 (2d ed. 1989).
60. Id. at 174, 180.
61. Id.
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1966).
63. J. Stephen O'Donnell, Artificial Intelligence Use in the Legal Profession:
What Are its Liabilities?, 4 SOFTWARE L.J. 77, 83 (1987).

64. Id.
65. Generally, a product may be defined as an article of commerce if it is
packaged and placed in the stream of commerce by its manufacturer. These
characteristics are distinguishable from a service, which is work performed by a
service provider in return for a fee. Some of the factors used by courts in determining whether a transaction involves a good or service include: (1) whether
the transaction involved a "sale"; (2) whether the defendant participated in the
article's marketing; and (3) whether the article was mass-produced. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 59, at 760.

66. U.C.C. § 2-105 (1985).
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precedent in holding that computer programs are goods
under the UCC,67 it is not clear whether any court has ruled
that programs are products covered by strict liability law.
Such a holding will likely increase the amount of litigation in
the tort area of strict liability.
Under strict liability, a product is defective if it is "unreasonably dangerous" beyond the expectation of an ordinary
consumer. 68 In California, a product is also defective if the
risk of inherent danger in the design outweighs the benefits
of the design.69 Because one of the rationales behind strict
liability is to pass the costs of liability on to the manufacturers, strict liability holds only sellers responsible. 0 A seller is
defined as a person engaged in the business of selling the
product. 7 1 Thus, a seller is distinguished from those who sell
things only on limited occasions and who do not make a living
from these sales. Another reason for imposing strict liability
is to shift losses to those who can better bear them financially.72 For this reason, strict liability may cover anyone
who is injured by a product, including purchasers, ultimate
users, and bystanders.7v The types of recoverable damages
include personal injury, property damage, and punitive
damages.74
Another product liability standard that is potentially applicable to MESs is negligence. This standard is also derived
from tort law and is discussed in the next section.
67.
68.
§ 402A
69.
70.
§ 97 at

See Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1991).
KEETON ET AL., supra note 59, at 189; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
cmt. g (1966).
Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 454 (Cal. 1978).
See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
704 (5th ed. 1985) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF
PRODUCTS LLMBILITY § 16:50 (Russell J. Davis et al. eds., 3d ed. 1987) [hereinafter AMERICAN LAW].
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f (1966).
72. 2 AMERICAN LAW, supra note 70, § 16:50.
73. 2 id.
74. 2 id. See also KEETON ET AL., supra note 59, at 605 (quoting Gryc v.
Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 1980)). While the majority of
state courts have held that strict liability does not cover the economic value of
the product itself, some state courts have held otherwise. See JOHN 0. HON.
NOLD ET AL., THE LAW OF SALES AND SECURED FINANCING 184 (6th ed. 1993). On
the other hand, the Restatement and the traditional view allow strict liability
recovery for damages to property other than the allegedly defective product. Id.
at 184, 187 (quoting East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476
U.S. 858 (1986)).
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Negligence

Negligence is the failure to exercise the degree of care a
reasonable person would exercise under similar circumstances. 75 Under a negligence standard, recovery for the injury suffered as a result of using an MES is allowed when: (1)
the developer/manufacturer has a duty of due care; (2) there
is a breach of that duty; and (3) both actual and proximate
causation can be established between the injury and the use
of an MES.7 6 Under negligence, the reasonableness of the
manufacturer's conduct is the key in determining liability.7 7
Therefore, no recovery is allowed if the manufacturer's conduct is deemed reasonable. The reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct is satisfied when the cost to eliminate the
risk of injury outweighs the probability and magnitude of the
risk.78 Under this standard, an injured victim may be denied
recovery despite a conscious decision by a developer not to
reduce a known risk.
In applying the negligence standard to MESs, the emerging issue is whether the duty of MES developers, as computer
professionals, should be held to a higher standard of due care
than that of the reasonable person.7 9 Under this scheme, the
standard of due care imposed on computer professionals is
similar to the professional standard of due care that other
professionals, such as doctors and attorneys, are subject to in
malpractice suits. For instance, to determine whether an attorney breaches his or her professional duty of care, the attorney's standard of care is that of a practitioner with similar
professional background and experience. Similarly, in the
75. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1032 (6th ed. 1990).
76. 1 AMERICAN LAW, supra note 70, § 10:1.
77. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 59, at 56.
78. An issue naturally arises as to whether the same standard of care applies in "ordinary" negligence and product liability negligence. Most courts use
"ordinary" negligence language in setting the standard of care in product liability cases. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 59, at 56. Thus, it follows that the
risk-burden balancing approach, which was promulgated by Judge Learned
Hand in the landmark case of United States v. CarrollTowing Co. to determine
whether the defendant's conduct is reasonable, should also apply to product liability cases. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
Under this approach, the defendant's conduct is reasonable if the burden (B)
imposed on the defendant to make the device safer outweighs the probability
(P) of the injury and the seriousness (L) of the potential injury (i.e., B > PL). Id.
at 173.
79. See, e.g., Diversified Graphics, Ltd. v. Groves, 868 F.2d 293 (8th Cir.
1989).
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case of MES developers, the duty of care would be compared
to that of other software developers with the same professional skill, knowledge, and experience. 8 0
Negligence protects purchasers, foreseeable users, and
bystanders.8 " Liable parties include manufacturers and dealers.8 2 Under negligence, the types of recoverable damages
include personal injury, property damage, and punitive damages.8 3 On the other hand, most jurisdictions do not allow
recovery for purely economic damages.8 4
In contrast to strict liability and negligence, which are
standards that have their roots in tort law, breach of warranty has its roots in contract law.8 5 Breach of warranty is
discussed in the section immediately below.
3)

Breach of Warranty

A warranty is an assurance by one party to a contract 8of6
a fact on which the other party to the contract may rely.
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) provides
warranty protection to damages associated with the sale of
goods.8 7 In general, the UCC recognizes three kinds of warexpress warranty, implied warranty of
ranties:
merchantability, and implied warranty of fitness.8 8 While an
express warranty is limited to the terms expressly agreed to
in the contract, implied warranties impose non-contractual
duties on the seller of goods. The implied warranty of
merchantability covers damages that arise out of the failure
to conform to the trade standard associated with goods in the
same class.8 9 The implied warranty of fitness covers damages that arise out of the reasonable reliance of the buyer on
the seller's knowledge and judgment when purchasing the
good.9 ° Implied warranties may be restricted by disclaimers,
80. See id. at 296.
81. See 1 AMERICAN LAw, supra note 70, § 10:6.
82. 1 id.
83. 1 id. § 10:12; 4 id. § 60:1.
84. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 59, at 593-98 (quoting Spring Motors
Distrib., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660 (N.J. 1985)).
85. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 59, at 15.
86. See BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1586 (6th ed. 1990).

87.
88.
89.
90.

U.C.C. § 2-102 (1990).
Id. §§ 2-313 to 2-315.
Id. § 2-314.
Id. § 2-315.
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as long as these disclaimers meet UCC guidelines and are not
unconscionable. 91
To qualify as a breach of warranty, the item causing injury must be a good.92 Under the UCC, goods are moveable
93
and tangible things identifiable at the time of sale. As discussed in the strict liability section above, while the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals has held that software products are
whether other courts will
goods under the UCC, it is not clear
94
consider MESs goods or services.
By its very definition, breach of warranty allows recovery
for property damage. While the UCC extended breach of warranty to cover physical injuries, recovery for physical injury
largely depends on the relationship of the injured party to the
buyer. 95 Under the warranty theory, protection is traditionally given to the buyer. 96 In some jurisdictions, protection is
extended to the buyer's family and household members, including guests. 97 Other jurisdictions extend the protection
further to cover any foreseeable natural person who might be
affected by the goods. 98 Finally, in a few jurisdictions, protection is extended to any foreseeable person who might be affected by the goods, including non-natural persons (i.e.,
corporations). 99

Strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty are liability standards under product liability law. Product liability law is not the only consumer protection scheme applicable
to MESs. Another consumer protection scheme applicable to
MESs is product safety regulation.
91. Id. § 2-316. Disclaimers cannot be used, however, to limit a warranty to
a third-party beneficiary. Id. § 2-318.
92. Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code applies only to the sale of
goods as opposed to the performance of services. Id. § 2-102.
93. Id. § 2-105.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 63-67.
95. U.C.C. § 2-318 (1990). Depending on the alternative (i.e., A, B, or C)
adopted by the state, physical injuries to the injured party may be recoverable.
Id.
96. As indicated by the language of the definition of a warranty, the concept
of warranty is rooted in contract law. See BLAC's LAw DICTIONARY 1586 (6th
ed. 1990); see also generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 59, at 15. Thus, under
contract law, the buyer clearly may claim damages resulting from the failure of
the product to perform as expected.
97. U.C.C. § 2-318 alt. A (1990).
98. Id. § 2-318 alt. B.
99. Id. § 2-318 alt. C.
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b. Product Safety Regulation
Product safety regulation is a system of rules designed to
regulate the safety of products sold to the public. 100 By requiring that manufacturers pay for the injuries caused by
their products, product liability law seeks to eliminate defective products from the market. 10 ' Similarly, product safety
regulation ultimately seeks to eliminate defective products
from the market.1 0 2 Product safety regulation, however, is
distinguishable from product liability law because product
safety regulation is established to "prevent unnecessary product-caused accidents.., before they happen,"10 3 as opposed to
penalizes the manufacturers afproduct liability law, which
104
ter the accident occurred.
Product safety regulations have been established by legislatures and administrative agencies at all government
levels-federal, state, and municipal.' 0 5 The most compre06
hensive regulation, however, occurs at the federal level,1
where agencies with budgets in the hundred-million-dollar
range oversee the implementation of nationwide regulations. 107 Even at this level, the effectiveness of product safety
regulations is questionable.' 0 8 Generally, violation of the
regulations will likely result in government sanction of the
product.' 0 9 With regard to private actions, however, questions often arise as to whether violation of a regulation results in liability per se, and conversely whether compliance
with a regulation automatically absolves the manufacturer of
any liability. Reasoning that government safety regulations
100. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 59, at 13.
101. See infra part IV.A.2.a.
102. Product safety regulation prevents unsafe products from being
keted by subjecting the manufacturing of products to minimum safety
dards. Under this scheme, products that fail to comply with or do not
safety standards may not be marketed. See, e.g., infra text accompanying
242-278.

marstanmeet
notes

103. KEETON ET AL., supra note 59, at 13.

104. Id. at 15. Under product liability law, a claim against the manufacturer
is allowed only after the victim is injured while using the product. Even so, the
manufacturer is not liable unless the victim proves that the product is "defective" in some manner. Id.
105. Id. at 13.
106. Id.
107. For example, the Food and Drug Administration budget for fiscal year
1988 was 477 million dollars. Id.
108. See id.
109. See infra text accompanying notes 146-161.
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are generally set at minimum levels, 110 many courts have
held that violation of a government regulation may result in
liability per se, while compliance with the regulation only creates a prima facie case of non-liability."1
The foregoing sections on product liability law and product safety regulation provide the background required to perform a balancing analysis of whether MESs should be regulated. In performing the analysis, all desirable as well as
undesirable effects of MES regulation should be considered.
One of the potential undesirable effects of MES regulation involves an infringement of free speech under the First Amendment. As such, free speech is discussed below.
c.

Free Speech Under The FirstAmendment

A major purpose of the First Amendment is to protect
political speech. 1 12 Other types of communication, however,
are also protected so long as they have serious literary, artistic, or scientific value. 1 3 On the contrary, there are some
types of communication that are not covered under the First
1 4
fighting words,"15
Amendment, such as criminal speech,
16
Under the above definition of protected
and obscenity.
110. For example, the Food and Drug Administration's approach to medical
devices subjects them "to the minimum level of control necessary to assure their
safety and effectiveness." James S. Benson et al., The FDA Regulation of Medical Devices: A Decade of Change, 43 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 495, 497 (1988).
111. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 59, at 357. Whether a private cause of
action is created under a federal statute depends on the statutory language and
intent. Id.
112. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("[T]here is practically
universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.").
113. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (holding that even patently
offensive communication is protected by the First Amendment if it has serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value).
114. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 994 (12th ed. 1991)
("[Biribery, perjury, and counseling murder are widely considered unprotected
by the First Amendment.").
115. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (creating the
"fighting words" doctrine).
116. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) ("This much has been
categorically settled by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the
First Amendment."). While the word "obscene" is often used to describe shocking violence, profanity, or blasphemy, in constitutional parlance, this term is
limited to materials dealing with sex. See Russell W. Galloway, Basic Free
Speech Analysis, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 883, 896 n.60 (1991).
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First Amendment
speech, MESs should be covered under the
117
value.
scientific
inherent
based on their
Due to the novelty of MESs, the issue of whether MES
regulation is an infringement on the First Amendment has
not been addressed by courts. In Jones v. J.B. Lippincott
Co., 1 18 however, a product liability case, the United States

District Court in Maryland cited First Amendment grounds
when refusing to extend liability to a medical textbook publisher.11 9 In Jones, a nursing student followed the published
instructions in a nursing textbook to treat herself for constipation. 120 Because the instructions were defective, she suffered a serious injury. 121 In its holding, the Jones court distinguished books from nautical charts, which are analogous
to navigational instruments and are considered products. 22
In contrast, the Jones court reasoned that applying strict liability to "the dissemination of an idea or knowledge in books
or other published material .

.

. could chill expression and

publication which is inconsistent with fundamental free
speech principles."123
In another product liability case, Smith v. Linn,'24 a
Pennsylvania appellate court refused to hold that an instructional book on dieting is a product. 125 In Smith, the victim
died of cardiac failure after losing one hundred pounds in five
months as a result of following a weight-loss plan in the publisher's diet book. 126 The Smith court upheld the trial court's
holding that the book was protected under the First Amendment.' 27 In rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the publisher has a duty to warn of an allegedly dangerous product,
the Smith court cited First Amendment concerns to distinguish between "iinstructions by a manufacturer which accompany medication or use of certain marketed goods ...
117. See infra text accompanying notes 229-240.
118. 694 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Md. 1988).
119. Id. at 1217.
120. Id. at 1216.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1217.
123. Jones v. J.B. Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216, 1217 (D. Md. 1988) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)).
124. 563 A.2d 123 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), aff'd, 587 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1991).
125. Id. at 126.
126. Id. at 125.
127. Id. at 126.
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[and] publication of books which espouse a writer's theory,
128
opinions, or ideology."
The above cases indicate the unwillingness of courts to
extend liability to defective information in books. Given the
inherent information-disseminating nature of MESs, an analogy may be made between books and MESs that would suggest that there exist First Amendment concerns in MES
12 9
regulation.
Due to the therapeutic function of MESs, they may qualify as medical devices. Currently, medical devices are regulated under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The regulatory scheme for medical devices under this Act is discussed
next.
B.

Safety Regulation of Medical Expert Systems
1.

1976 Amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act

The rationale for regulating MESs is obvious. Defective
MESs are potentially hazardous to the user. Under the 1976
amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA),
Congress extended the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
regulatory mandate, originally limited to drugs, to include
medical devices. 130 While MESs are not likely to qualify as
drugs, they probably qualify as medical devices. The statutory language and the legislative intent of the 1976 amendments to the FDCA are examined briefly below to determine
whether or not MESs qualify as medical devices.
a. Statutory Language
Under the 1976 amendments to the FDCA, a medical device is defined broadly as:
[A]n instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, including any component, part, or accessory
...intended for use in the diagnosis of a disease or other
conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals . . .[or] in128. Id.
129. See infra text accompanying notes 239-240.
130. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 331, 334, 351, 352, 358, 360, 374, 376,
381 (1988)) (codified as enacted at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-360k, 379, 379a (1988)).
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tended to affect the structure or any function of the body
of man or other animals .... '31
At first glance, this broad definition seems to cover every
item used for medical diagnosis and treatment. Under this
definition, the item's intended use is of great importance to
determine whether it is a medical device. Since MESs are
used to assist in making medical diagnoses, it appears that
they fall into this category. A stricter interpretation of the
definition, however, could exclude MESs from the category of
medical devices, as the intangible nature of computer
software is clearly distinguishable from the tangible nature
of the items referred to in the definition. 13 2 This reasoning is
analogous to that of those who define computer software as
services and not products. Due to the ambiguity of the statutory language, the FDCA legislative intent must be examined
to decide whether the FDA has the authority to regulate
MESs.
b. Legislative Intent
While "it is clear that the [FDCA] amendments were
designed to clarify the demarcation between drugs and medical devices,"' 3 3 it is, at best, inconclusive whether Congress
intended to regulate MESs.13 4 At the time the amendments
were passed, there were four research applications of artificial intelligence (AI) in medicine. 13 5 It is not clear, however,
whether Congress was aware of these AI applications, since
there was no mention of medical expert systems or anything
similar in the legislative history. Because these AI applications were in their initial stages of development and their
uses were limited to the research laboratories, it is doubtful
that the legislature intended to regulate MESs directly when
it passed the 1976 Amendments.

131. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (1988).
132. See Vincent Brannigan, The Regulation of Medical Expert Computer
Software As A "Device" Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 27
JURIMETRICS

J. 370, 373 (1987).

133. Id. at 375.
134. Id. at 375-76.
135. Shortliffe, supra note 1, at 63-64.
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c. Medical Expert Systems as Medical Devices
The use of MESs to diagnose disease indicates that they
are intended to be used as medical devices. While it is true
that computer software is not mentioned in the definition, it
may be argued that Congress intended this definition to be
very broad. 136 Furthermore, because the FDA stated that it
considers MESs to be medical devices, 1 37 courts may exercise
deference to the federal agency's expertise in matters related
to the agency's jurisdiction. 138 Finally, because the need to
safeguard public safety is of paramount concern, courts will
likely hold that MESs are medical devices subject to regulation by the FDA. For the purpose of this comment, MESs
13 9
will be considered medical devices.
d.

Medical Device Regulation Under the 1976
Medical Device Amendments

The following sections provide a detailed discussion of
the FDA regulatory scheme for medical devices. The overall
FDA regulatory scheme involves classifying medical devices
into three classes and imposing the "appropriate" level of regulation on each of these classes. The FDA classification
scheme is addressed first, followed by a discussion of the different regulation levels. Finally, the current FDA position on
the regulation of MESs is examined.
136. See 2 JAMES T. O'REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION § 18.02
(1979).
137. See 2 id. § 18.02 (Supp. 1991).
138. Brannigan, supra note 132, at 376.
139. Prescription drug manufacturers are liable for injuries caused by their
drugs only if they fail to warn of defects that they knew or should have known
about. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. k (1966). This is basically a negligence standard. KEETON ET AL., supra note 59, at 447 (citing Brown
v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988)). The reason that prescription
drugs are subject to negligence and not strict liability is that, as unavoidably
unsafe products, drugs are of great societal benefit, and applying strict liability
to them would stifle medical research and thereby make drugs less available to
the public. Id. Since a great majority of courts have extended the "unavoidably
unsafe products" concept of comment k to medical devices, the FDA's effort to
regulate MESs as medical devices will likely qualify MESs as unavoidably unsafe products. Id. at 454. The classification of MESs as medical devices may
have a direct effect on whether strict liability or negligence should be applied to
manufacturers of MESs.
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1) Medical Device Classifications
The tremendous variety of medical devices (i.e., from
bedpans to pacemakers) presents a very broad spectrum of
risks. In order to deal with the enormous variety of medical
devices, the FDA classified them into three categories based
on the level of risk posed by the device. 141 Class I devices
pose the lowest level of risk to users and are therefore subjected to the minimum level of regulation. 14 1 Class I devices
include tongue depressors, elastic bandages, ice bags, and
bedpans.142 Class II devices constitute the bulk of medical
devices' 43 and require a higher level of regulation as a result
of the somewhat increased risks. Class II devices include syringes, bone plates, hearing aids, resuscitators, and electrocardiograph electrodes.' 44 Finally, Class III devices are subjected to the strictest level of regulation. Class III devices
devices
include pacemakers, intra-uterine contraceptive
145
joints.
artificial
and
hearts,
(IUDs), artificial
2)

Medical Device Regulation

The current medical device regulatory schemes include
general controls, performance standards, or pre-market approval (PMA).146 As their names indicate, the most stringent
regulation involves PMA.' 47 The next-most-stringent regulation involves performance standards.4 General controls represent the lowest level of regulation. 1
49
General controls apply to devices in all three classes.1
These controls include meeting the requirements of the misbranding and adulteration provisions, registration of the
manufacturer's establishments, listing of products, record140. See Robert Adler, The 1976 Medical Device Amendment: A Step in the
Right Direction Needs Another Step in the Right Direction, 43 FOOD DRUG
COSM. L.J. 511, 512-13 (1988); Benson et al., supra note 110, at 497.
141. See Adler, supra note 140, at 512; Benson et al., supra note 110, at 497.
142. Adler, supra note 140, at 512.
143. See Brannigan, supra note 132, at 372.
144. See Adler, supra note 140, at 513.
145. Id.
146. See Adler, supra note 140, at 512-13; Benson et al., supra note 110, at
497.
147. See Adler, supra note 140, at 512-13; Benson et al., supra note 110, at
497.
148. See Adler, supra note 140, at 512-13; Benson et al., supra note 110, at
497.
149. See Benson et al., supra note 110, at 497.
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keeping, reporting of adverse effects under the Medical Device Reporting regulation (MDR), submission of pre-marketing notification, and compliance with good manufacturing
practice (GMP).' 50
In addition to general controls, performance standards
are required for Class II devices in order to assure that they
are safe and effective. 15 1 Under this scheme, a medical device
that fails to comply with promulgated performance standards
may not be marketed. 1 5 2 For example, a bone plate, used in
treating bone fractures, may be required to be constructed
from stainless steel or a similar metal to prevent corrosion
when the device is inside the human body. As a result, bone
plates constructed from metals that corrode may not be
marketed.
PMAs are required for Class III devices before they may
be marketed. A PMA involves performing laboratory and
clinical testing to demonstrate that the device is reasonably
safe.' 53 This process may take years.1'5 Industry representatives predict that gaining FDA pre-market approval for
55
medical expert systems may take up to ten years.
When Congress passed the 1976 Amendments, preamendment devices (i.e., devices already on the market) were
also required to be classified and regulated. 5 6 Despite the
fact that the FDA later classified some of these devices as
Class III, they were permitted to remain on the market pending regulation by the FDA. 15 7 Post-amendment devices (devices that became available on the market after the passage
of the 1976 Amendments) are thus at a great disadvantage,
because they must go through PMA, while similar pre58
amendment devices are allowed to remain on the market.
150. See Adler, supra note 140, at 512; Benson et al., supra note 110, at 497.
151. See Adler, supra note 140, at 512-13.
152. See id.
153. See Adler, supra note 140, at 513; Benson et al., supra note 110, at 497.
154. See Adler, supra note 140, at 519-20.
155. See Beutel, supra note 7, at 22. The FDA PMA proceeding is a long and
arduous process that requires the device manufacturer to overcome numerous
procedural hurdles. See infra text accompanying notes 268-278. Given the
slow pace of the process to obtain PMA approval, it is easy to understand why
MES industry officials are worried that MESs might have to undergo PMA
proceedings.
156. See Adler, supra note 140, at 513.
157. See id. at 514-15.
158. See id. at 513.
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To correct such unfairness, Congress established a provision
to allow Class I,II,and III post-amendment devices that are
substantially equivalent to pre-amendment devices (i.e., have
the same technological characteristics, or are as safe and effective) to bypass PMA and enter the stream of commerce.' 59
The manufacturer, however, must notify the FDA ninety
days in advance, indicate to which class the device belongs,
and certify that the device complies with all known requirements. 160 Obviously, a "substantially equivalent" device is
subject to the same testing ultimately imposed by the FDA on
16 1
pre-amendment devices.

2. FDA's 1989 Draft Policy on the Regulation of
Computerized Medical Devices
In an attempt to clarify the confusion surrounding the
FDA's position on the regulation of medical expert systems,
the FDA is currently working on a guide entitled Draft FDA
162
Policy Guidance for Regulation of Computer Products.
This document, which is currently in its second draft, clarifies the level of regulation the FDA is planning to apply to
computer products used in medicine. 63 While the Draft Policy is subject to change prior to its official release, it provides
a fair indication of the FDA's position on this issue. The
Draft Policy distinguishes between a computer product that
is "a component, part, or accessory of a product recognized as
a medical device in its own right... [and a] computer product[] which [is a] medical device[ ], and is not [a] component[ ], part[ ], or accessor[y] of ...[a] medical device[ ].9)164
While the former is regulated according to the classification
of its parent device, the latter is subject to one of four levels of
regulation, depending on the device's characteristics.1 65 The
Draft Policy addresses only computer products that are medical devices.
159. See Adler, supra note 140, at 513-15.
160. Id. at 513-14.
161. See id. at 515-16.
162. Food and Drug Administration, Draft Policy Guidance for Regulation of
Computer Products (Nov. 13, 1989) (unpublished draft, on file with author)
[hereinafter Draft Policy].
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1-2 (citation omitted).
165. Id.
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a. Existing Exemptions
Three types of computer products are currently exempted from registration, listing, pre-market notification,
and GMP. 1 66 These three types of devices are: general-purpose articles, computer products manufactured by licensed
practitioners solely for use in their practice, and computer
16 7
products used solely in teaching and non-clinical research.
A "general purpose article [is] a product that is not labeled or promoted for medical uses, but which, by virtue of its
application in health care, meets the definition of a medical
device."1 68 Two examples of general-purpose articles were
given in the Draft Policy: "a computer which has been
programmed... to display values from tests on human specimens, [and] a data base . . .that is used by a health care
professional to identify patients at risk for a given medical
procedure.' 6 9
Computer products that are manufactured by licensed
practitioners solely for use in their practice are also exempted
from FDA regulation.170 These products are not subject to
regulation because they are not distributed commercially.
Likewise, computer products used in teaching and nonclinical research are exempted from FDA regulation.' 7 This
exemption covers "research and development efforts which
have not progressed to the stage of human
experimentation.' 7 2
b. FutureExemptions
Information management products such as MESs, artificial intelligence, and other types of decision support systems
will be exempted from registration, listing, pre-market notification, and compliance with MDR and GMP regulations, provided that they are "intended to involve competent human intervention before any impact on human health occurs."173
Currently, these products have a "future exemption" status,
because they are not officially classified as Class I, Class II,
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 2-3.
at 2.
at 2.
at 3.
at 3.
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or Class III devices and must still go through the normal exemption-granting procedures. 17 4 Unclassified pre-amendment devices, however, that are not intended to involve competent human intervention are not exempted from these
regulations.

17 5

c. Pre-Market Notifications
Prior to marketing, the FDA must be notified of postamendment and classified pre-amendment computer products that are "significantly modified."176 Additionally, subsequent to their modification, if these devices are found to be
substantially equivalent to another classified device, they
will be subjected to the same regulations as the equivalent
device. 177
d. Pre-MarketApproval
According to the FDA, at this time no computer medical
device other than those that are "component[s], part[s], or ac78
cessor[ies] of other device[s]" require pre-market approval.
Nevertheless, the FDA recognizes that there may be computer medical devices classified as Class III devices or substantially equivalent to Class III devices.1 79 Pre-market approval for these devices is required to ascertain their safety
and effectiveness.

80

e. Summary
Based on the guidelines stated in the Draft Policy, medical expert systems that are used with competent human intervention are not subject to regulation. The Draft Policy,
however, also implies that MESs will be subject to regulation
if competent human intervention, namely a physician with
extensive medical training, is eliminated from their use.' 8 '
174. Id. In the interim, products already available on the market are still
exempted from the regulations mentioned above. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 3.
178. Id. at 4.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 173-175. This inference may be
made because currently only decision support systems that involve human intervention are exempted from regulations.

19941
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Advents in MES technology indicate that MESs are becoming
more automated and "intelligent" in diagnosing and treating
diseases. As a result, future MESs may not require supervision from a physician to operate. If this scenario occurs, the
FDA will have to classify MESs and impose regulatory controls on them. Thus, the perceived need to regulate medical
expert systems is more likely to increase than diminish over
time.
III.

IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM

As the preceding material illustrates, the FDA currently
exempts MESs from regulation. This exemption, however, is
conditional and subject to change. In determining whether or
not MESs should be regulated, the following analysis
presents arguments as to why MES regulation is needed and
why product liability law alone is inadequate to protect user
interests. The analysis section also discusses the adequacy
and effectiveness of the FDA's current regulatory scheme.
Based on these analyses, the proposal section suggests modifications to the current scheme to make it applicable to
MESs. The proposal also suggests alternate regulatory
schemes.

IV.
A.

ANALYsIs

Should Medical Expert Systems be Regulated by the
FDA?

A comprehensive consumer protection scheme includes
8 3 This
both product liability law i8 2 and product safety law.'
assertion is especially true for MESs, considering the risk
they pose and the heavily regulated nature of the medical
field. In the following sections, the high-risk nature of MESs
and the regulation of the medical field are examined to highlight the need for MESs regulation. Next, the inadequacies of
product liability law are discussed. These inadequacies compel the conclusion that product liability law, by itself, is inadequate to protect the safety and legal interests of MES users
as MESs become more widely available.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 58-99.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 100-111.
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1. Medical Expert Systems Should be Regulated
a. Medical Expert Systems are Risky Devices
Product safety regulation attempts to prevent defective
products from being marketed in the first place.18 4 Since
MESs are very complex interactive software that contain
thousands of lines of codes with millions of possible permutations,18 5 the potential for numerous defects in a medical expert system is obvious.18 6 Given the complexity and the risk
associated with MESs, the FDA's consideration of imposing
regulations on these systems to assure their safety and effectiveness is quite reasonable, especially in light of the new and
unproved technology involved in MESs. Although the FDA
currently does not impose any regulation on MESs,' 8 7 when
MESs are made available to the general public without the
benefit of physician intervention, the FDA will likely reconsider regulating them as medical devices.
b. The Entire Medical Field is Heavily Regulated
Currently, both state and federal governments impose
regulations on the entire field of medicine. In addition to
medical devices,' 88 the FDA also applies regulatory controls
on other medical products, such as drugs.' 8 9 In the case of
drugs, current regulatory controls seek to eliminate false
claims and drug defects that proliferated in the industry
prior to enactment of the FDCA. 190 Currently, the FDA actively controls the testing, manufacturing method, and marketing of these products. 19 ' The medical service sector is also
heavily regulated under the banner of public health and
safety.' 92 Medical service providers such as doctors, dentists,
pharmacists, and nurses are regulated by state licensing
184. See supra text accompanying notes 100-111.

185. See Miyaki, supra note 56, at 131; Warren S. Reid, The 14 Commandments of Stopping Software ErrorsBefore It's Too Late: Power Testing, 9 THE
COMPUTER LAw. 22, 23 (1992).
186. See Miyaki, supra note 56, at 129.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 173-175.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 130-161.
189. See 1 O'REILLY, supra note 136, § 1.02.
190. See 1 id.
191. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 59, at 943 (quoting Sindell v. Abbott
Lab., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980)).
192. See Louis M. Dyll, Professional Practice Regulation, in LEGAL
MEDICINE: LEGAL DYNAMIcs OF MEDICAL ENCOUNTERS 82 (Harold L. Hirsh et al.
eds., 1988).
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boards under an occupational licensing scheme. 193 A licenseholder may be subject to disciplinary action, including license
revocation, if he or she breaches any of the licensing standards. 194 This occupational licensing scheme is designed to
possess a minimum competency
ensure that practitioners
95
level in their practice.

c.

The Need to Regulate MESs

Testing practices in the software industry underscore the
need to regulate MESs. It is generally recognized that testing is the most effective method of discovering defects in computer software.' 96 Moreover, it is widely accepted in the
software industry that software performance testing is essential to the marketing success of the product. 97 As a result,
testing in the software industry is usually fairly comprehensive. 198 Nevertheless, a recent report by the Software Engineering Institute of Carnegie Mellon University indicates
that "throughout the entire software industry, testing is inadequate and promptly suspended when time or money runs
out." 199 The fact that inadequate and sporadic software testing practices still persist, despite a widespread perception of
the need for performance testing, is strong evidence that
MES testing should not be optional. Rather, standardized
performance testing of MESs should be required and regulated by the FDA in light of the risk posed by MESs.2 ° °
193. See id.; Sue G. Graziano, Computer Malpractice:A New Tort on the Horizon?, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 177, 182 (1991).
194. See Dyll, supra note 192, at 82-83.
195. See id.
196. See Reid, supra note 185, at 9.
197. See id. It has been said that the cost to re-instill eroded confidence of
users in software dependability may be up to "100 times" more expensive than
if the original error is caught during the testing phase. Id.
198. See generally Edward W. Bulchis & Maurice J. Pirio, PreservingIntellectual Property Rights DuringSoftware Beta Testing, 7 THE COMPUTER LAW. 1,
1 (1990). Testing in the computer software industry usually involves an alpha
and a beta phase. Id. The alpha testing phase is performed in-house by the
"developer's staff and, typically, in close association with the designers and programmers." Id. Conversely, the beta testing phase is performed by "an independent third party," usually a potential customer of the software. Id.
199. Reid, supra note 185, at 22.
200. See infra text accompanying notes 266-267.
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Summary

Regulation is needed to eliminate unsafe products from
entering the market. This is an issue of paramount concern
that requires government intervention. Indeed, both state
and federal governments acknowledge the importance of this
concern by regulating the entire medical field. Regulation is
necessary for MESs because it would allow the FDA to evaluate the safety of MESs prior to permitting them to be
marketed.
2.

ProductLiability Law Alone is Inadequate to
Safeguard Against Defects and to Protect User
Interests

Since the goals of both product liability law 20 1 and product safety law20 2 are to reduce injuries due to defective products, opponents of MES regulation may argue that regulation
is redundant in light of the existence of a comprehensive
product liability system in this country. A closer examination, however, of the product liability system reveals that this
system, by itself, is not adequate to safeguard against defective MESs. Furthermore, the interests of MES injured victims may not be adequately protected due to inherent weaknesses in product liability theories.
a.

Product Liability Law Alone is Inadequate to
Ensure the Safety of Users

Under the product liability system, liability serves to deter manufacturing of defective products. Liability of manufacturers erodes consumer confidence in the product. Moreover, liability also forces the manufacturers to raise the price
of the product to pay for redesign cost and the increase in
liability insurance premiums. Erosion of consumer confidence and price increase may result in a loss of competitiveness and ultimately a loss of profits. For these reasons, the
threat of liability may force the manufacturer to correct a defect or to remove a product from the stream of commerce.
These corrections are basically remedial measures, however,
and usually are made after a defective product caused injuries to product users. Because injuries caused by defective
201. See supra text accompanying notes 58-99.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 100-111.
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2 °3 subMESs are potentially serious and perhaps even fatal,
sequent remedial measures are meaningless to the injured
victims. From the victim's perspective, defective MESs
should never enter the stream of commerce.

b.

ProductLiability Law Alone is Inadequate to
Protect User Interests

Product liability requires victims of defective products to
20 4 At its
sue the manufacturer to recover for their injuries.
best, a court trial is a major inconvenience for injured victims
of defective products. At its worst, a court trial is a traumatic
experience for victims. Moreover, filing suit by no means assures recovery, as the victim is subject to the unpredictability
of a jury trial.
As the background section on product liability indicates,
20 5 negligence,20 6 or
the issue of whether strict liability,
2 0 7 should apply to MESs remains unsetbreach of warranty
tled.20 8 Whether strict liability, negligence, or breach of warranty is applied to MESs, however, inherent weaknesses exist in all three theories that may deprive victims of
compensation for their injuries. These weaknesses are discussed in more detail below.
1)

Negligence

If negligence applies to MESs, some victims of defective
MESs will be denied recovery for their injuries. Under negligence, a party is liable only if his or her conduct is unreasonable.20 9 Reasonableness is determined by balancing the burden to prevent the risk against the probability and
203. In a typical scenario, the MES prescribes the wrong medicine for the
patient, based upon a defective diagnosis, and the patient suffers an injury
upon ingesting the medicine. The seriousness of the injury depends on the type
of medicine, the dosage, and the patient's physical condition. It is possible,
however, that the patient may suffer a fatal injury as a result of a defective
MES diagnosis.
204. In a recent study, based upon cases from the late 1970's, 19% of all
product liability claims filed were dropped, and 95% of the remaining claims
were settled. W. Kip Viscusi, The Determinants of the Disposition of Products
Liability Claims and Compensation for Bodily Injury, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 321,
328-29 (1986). Plaintiffs won 37% of the remaining claims at trial. Id.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 59-74.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 75-85.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 86-99.
208. See supra text accompanying note 58.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 76-77.
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magnitude of the risk. 2 10 Thus, MES manufacturers may escape liability if the. cost to eliminate the risk posed by MESs
is so prohibitively expensive that it outweighs the risk. In
view of this balancing approach, the process of determining
reasonableness essentially involves "line-drawing." Because
defects of MESs tend to be very subtle, discovery of these defects prior to user injury is difficult, and the burden on the
manufacturer to eliminate these defects is high. Consequently, some victims of defective MESs will be denied recovery due to the inherent nature of this line-drawing approach.
2) Strict Liability
In theory, strict liability eliminates the unfair residual
effect of line-drawing in negligence. 2 n Strict liability does
not mean absolute liability, however, and it is inevitable that
some victims of defective MESs will also be denied recovery
under this theory. Moreover, the basis of strict liability is essentially the same as negligence, since the strict liability concept of "defective" also involves line-drawing.212 Under strict
liability, a product is defective if it is "unreasonably dangerous" beyond the expectation of the average consumer considering the characteristics of similar products or if the risk of
the design outweighs the design's benefits. 213 As indicated by
the language of the two theories of defectiveness, whether a
product is defective depends on the reasonableness of the
trade-offs between safety and cost. 21 4 Thus, under strict lia210. See supra note 78.
211. Among the policy objectives advanced by courts and commentators in
support of strict liability include the inadequacy of negligence liability to induce
manufacturers to make safe products and the insufficient compensation for injured plaintiffs under a negligence theory. See John E. Montgomery & David G.
Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for
Defective Products,27 S.C. L. REv. 803, 809-10 (1976); JAMES A. HENDERSON &
RICHARD N. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 744 (1988).
212. Because absolute safety is not possible, the question of whether a product is defective is one of degree. In other words, the question of "defectiveness"
is whether the trade-offs between safety and cost are sound. KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 59, at 176, 189.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
214. The concept of consumer expectation originates from the law of contract. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 59, at 190-91. In general, contract law
cannot fulfill every expectation induced by a promise. Rather, the law may enforce only reasonable promises. That is, to be enforceable, "'[tihe expectation
must be one that most people would have; and the promise must be one that
most people would perform.'" Id. (quoting 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CONTRACTS 1-2
(1963)). To determine the reasonableness of a promise or an expectation in a
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bility, some victims of defective MESs will also be denied recovery due to the nature of the balancing approach.
The nature of MESs suggests that MES manufacturers
may avoid liability under the "state of the art" defense.
"State of the art" is a recognized defense under strict liability.21 5 Under this defense, if a product risk is unknown or the
means of avoiding the risk is unknown at the time the prod216
uct is manufactured or sold, the product is not defective.
Since MESs are software programs that consist of thousands
of lines of computer codes and millions of combinations,
knowing and avoiding all the risks is almost impossible.
Thus, by raising this defense, MES manufacturers may escape liability.
3)

Breach of Warranty

A third theory under product liability law is breach of
warranty.21 7 As its name suggests, breach of warranty is
rooted in contract law, as compared to strict liability and negligence, which are rooted in tort. Since a warranty is essentially a contractual term, it may be disclaimed.21 8 Under the
UCC, disclaimers for express and implied warranties (implied warranty of merchantability and implied warranty of
fitness) are allowed provided they are conspicuous to the
buyer and follow UCC guidelines. 21 9 Thus, by erecting an effective disclaimer, MES manufacturers may escape liability,
even for physical injuries.
c.

Summary

Product liability law alone is inadequate to safeguard the
safety of MES users and to protect the interests of injured
victims of defective MESs. In general, measures to correct
defective products are remedial in nature, since they are
contractual relationship, the parties' interests at stake are weighed against
each other. Therefore, the consumer expectation test involves balancing the interests of the parties; namely, the manufacturer and the consumer. Similarly,
the risk-benefit test involves balancing the probability and the seriousness of
the harm against the costs of improving the product's safety. Id. at 206-07.
215. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 59, at 409-10.
216. See id.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 86-99.
218. Disclaimer of warranties may be negotiated by the parties just like any
other contractual term, provided that the parties comply with contract law.
219. See supra text accompanying note 91.
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taken only after some injury occurs. Due to weaknesses in all
three product liability theories, many victims of defective
MESs may not be compensated for their injuries. Moreover,
there is a significant chance MES developers may go out of
business a short time after marketing a system, as the
software industry is filled with short-term, start-up corporations. Therefore, there is a good chance that victims of defective MESs will not be able to receive compensation.
Adverse Effects and Constitutionalityof Medical Expert
System Regulation
Despite the overwhelming need for MES regulation, such
regulation may have potentially adverse effects on the development of MESs. These adverse effects must be considered
in the implementation of an effective regulatory scheme. At
the same time, since MES regulation has an adverse and chilling effect on free speech, the constitutionality of MES regulation is also an issue that deserves discussion.
B.

1.

Without Regulation, Advances in Medical Expert
System Technology Will Mirror the Rapid
Advances in the Computer Software
Industry

In the past few years, devoid of regulation and fueled by
the widespread use of microcomputers, the software industry
experienced explosive growth.2 2 ° Indeed, the software industry was transformed from a fledgling industry whose specialized and expensive products were designed primarily for sophisticated corporate and institutional users, to one whose
products are mass-marketed, affordable, and readily available to the average consumer. 2 2 ' In stores across the country, hundreds of application software packages are available
to aid consumers in office management, education, income
tax filing, checkbook balancing, and computer networking.
Critics of regulatory controls for MESs argue that if the
220. See Beutel, supra note 7, at 22; Mark F. Radcliff, The Future of Computer Law: Ten Challenges for The Next Decade, 8 THE COMPUTER LAW. 1, 1
(1991).
221. The personal computer software industry topped $7 billion in 1992. Big
Growth in Software, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 20, 1993, at D3. See also
Phillip Abromats, Comment, Copyright Misuse and Anticompetitive Software
Licensing Restrictions: Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 52 U. PiTT. L.
REV. 629, 629 (1991).
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software industry had been burdened with regulatory controls, this software explosion would not have occurred.2 2 2 Instead, regulation would have slowed the rapid advances of
the software technology and inhibited investments in this
area.2 2 3 The growth of the software industry is examined below. The characteristics of its history help explain the adverse effects regulation may have on the development of medical expert systems.
Small start-up companies proliferated in the computer
software industry in its infancy. These small start-up operations represented the driving force behind the industry's
rapid advances because of constant competition to develop innovations. Most of these start-up companies were able to get
off the ground because of low capital requirements and fast
investment returns. 224 Generally, a software start-up company requires "few development costs other than purchasing
[a] computer system, paying salaries[,] and providing a roof
over the heads of the programmers."2 25 Software also has a
faster investment return because its development cycle is
shorter than that of most new, complicated products.2 2 6 In
the software industry, rapid development is often crucial to
the company's survival.2 27
Imposing regulations on MESs will result in added development costs associated with the required qualification tests,
as well as added administrative costs associated with regulatory compliance. Furthermore, regulation will lengthen development time and delay software from reaching the market. Naturally, the amount of added cost and the length of
the delay will depend on the regulatory controls that the FDA
imposes on MESs. Under the FDA's current regulatory
scheme, the level of regulation depends on the device classification.2 28 Given the risks that the FDA perceives are associ222. See Charles S. Furfine, The FDA's Policy on the Regulation of Computerized Medical Devices, 9 MD COMPUTING 97, 99 (1992).
223. See id.; Beutel, supra note 7, at 22.
224. See Duncan M. Davidson, Why Software Companies Are Attractive to
Venture Capitalists,1 THE COMPUTER LAW. 43, 43 (1984).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Due to the competitive nature of the software industry, new software
released into the market today probably will be outdated in six months. Because of this short life cycle, software companies must keep the development
time for their products down if they are to survive the competition.
228. See Draft Policy, supra note 162, at 3.
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ated with medical expert systems, it is possible that the FDA
will require medical expert system manufacturers to go
through PMA prior to allowing them to place systems in the
stream of commerce. While manufacturers of MESs may be
able to absorb the delay and added cost incurred from lesser
regulatory controls (such as general controls and performance standards), they may not survive the long delay and added costs incurred from undergoing PMA. Start-up software
companies often need to market their product quickly to
maintain their cash flow. Moreover, as a result of the added
costs and long development cycle involved, fewer start-up operations will be able to enter the field. Without the traditional attractions of low capital requirements and fast investment returns, fewer investments will be made in the area of
medical expert systems. Together, these factors will discourage competition because only companies with adequate resources, usually large corporations, will enter the field. Reduced competition will likely stifle innovation and delay
advances in medical expert system technology.
2.

Constitutional Issue: Chilling of Free Speech

An additional undesirable effect of regulating medical expert systems is the infringement on speech protected by the
First Amendment. A full analysis of this issue is beyond the
scope of this comment; the following discussion is limited to
existence of the issue in medical expert system regulation.
a. Protected Communication
While political speech is at the core of the First Amendment, other types of communication that have serious liter229
ary, artistic, political, or scientific value are also protected.
Since medical expert systems disseminate medical information to the user, this dissemination is a communication.
Moreover, because the communication involves medical
knowledge, such communication has scientific value. Thus,
MESs may well be protected under the First Amendment.
In Jones v. J.B. Lippincott Co.,23° the United States District Court in Maryland refused to extend strict liability to
the publisher of a textbook on medical and surgical nurs229. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
230. 694 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Md. 1988).
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ing.11 1 The plaintiff suffered an injury when, after consulting
the textbook, she treated herself for constipation by taking a
hydrogen-peroxide enema.23 2 The Jones court stated that extending liability to "the dissemination of an idea or knowledge in books or other published material ... could chill expression and publication which is inconsistent with
fundamental free speech principles."2 33
In Smith v. Linn,2 3 4 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to hold that an instructional book on dieting is a product. 23 5 In Smith, the victim died of cardiac failure after taking part in a weight-loss plan outlined in the publisher's diet
book.23 6 The Smith court cited the First Amendment as the
reason for its refusal to hold the publisher liable for the injury.2 3 Although the Smith court was moved by the plaintiff's grievous circumstances, it ruled that the need for First
Amendment protection to prevent government oppression
outweighed the harm in the instant case.2 38
Although both Jones and Smith are product liability
cases, 2 39 an analogy may be made between these two cases
and the regulation of medical expert systems. As with liability, regulation also discourages dissemination of information.
In fact, regulation may even restrict the dissemination of in231. Id. at 1217.
232. Id.
233. Id. (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1987)).
234. 563 A.2d 123 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), aff'd, 587 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1991).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 125 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
237. Id. at 126.
238. Id. at 127.
239. Assume, arguendo, that injuries suffered as a result of defective information from books are recoverable under product liability law. To recover for
an injury, a victim could bring suit against either the book publisher or the
author. Because a book publisher furnishes information for profit, he or she
meets the strict-liability definition of a 'seller." As such, a suit against a publisher may be brought under the theory of strict-liability. On the other hand,
since an author is an assembler of information, he or she does not meet the
definition of a 'seller." Nonetheless, assuming that books are considered goods,
an author could face liability under the theory of breach of warranty. More
specifically, an author could be liable for breaching the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose when, following the instructions in a book, a
reader suffers injury as a result of his or her reasonable reliance on the author's
knowledge and judgment. See D. C. Toedt, Reducing the PotentialForLiability
in the Dissemination of Computerized Information and Expertise, 6 THE COMPUTER LAw. 1, 2 (1989). Because publishers are the ones with deep pockets,
however, they are more likely to be sued for injuries caused by defective
information.
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formation more than extending liability does. Such regulation may be a prior restraint, as opposed to subsequent punishment, that "delay[s] the communication and perhaps cut[s]
it off altogether."2 40 The functions of MESs may be compared
to those of medical textbooks and physician handbooks. Like
medical textbooks, MESs are used to look up a disease based
on given symptoms. Moreover, like physician handbooks,
medical expert systems are used to prescribe treatment for a
known disease. Thus, regulating medical expert systems
chills expression and therefore violates the fundamental
right of free speech.
3.

Summary

Applying the FDA's current regulatory scheme to MESs
will likely add development costs and, more importantly,
lengthy delays to the development of MESs. In addition to
these potentially harmful effects, MES regulation may infringe on speech protected by the First Amendment. As a result, such regulation may be subject to challenge by MES
manufacturers.2 4 1
Clearly, an improved regulatory scheme for MESs is desirable. The current FDA regulatory scheme for medical devices will be examined next to determine whether any modifications may be made to meet this objective.
C.

The Current FDA Regulatory Scheme for Medical
Devices

The FDA, in its current regulatory scheme, implements a
three-tiered system that requires a medical device to meet a
minimum safety standard, depending on the level of risk
posed by the device.2 42 Class I devices, which pose the lowest
240. See Galloway, supra note 116, at 928 (explaining that such prior restraints on communications are subject to strict scrutiny).
241. Even if MES regulation constitutes an infringement on First Amendment rights, such regulation may still be valid if it can withstand means-end
scrutiny as applied by the Supreme Court. See id. at 907-08. Currently, there
are three distinct levels of means-end scrutiny. They are strict scrutiny, midlevel scrutiny, and rationality review. See id. at 909. As indicated by their
names, strict scrutiny is the most demanding test, and rationality review is the
least demanding test. See id. at 909, 954. It is not clear which of these tests
would be applied to MES regulation. Since MESs arguably encompass protected speech, however, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will apply rationality review to MES regulation.
242. See Adler, supra note 140, at 512; Benson et al., supra note 110, at 497.
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level of risk to users, are subject only to general controls.2 4 3
These general controls require the manufacturer to register
with the FDA, 24 4 to report known adverse effects caused by
the device to the FDA,2 45 to provide labeling, 24 6 to comply
with the FDA's adulteration and misbranding provisions,2 47
and to follow good manufacturing practices (GMP).2 48 Class
II devices have a higher level of risk than Class I devices. In
addition to the general controls required for Class I devices,
Class II devices are also subject to the performance standard
of similar devices. 24 9 Finally, Class III devices pose the highest level of risk to users. For this reason, Class III devices
are required to undergo pre-market approval in addition to
compliance with general controls.2 5 °
1.

General Controls

Since MESs are presently unclassified,2 5 ' it is not clear
what regulatory controls will apply to these systems. At the
very least, MESs will be subject to general controls. Application of certain general controls to MESs appear reasonable,
because these controls require little effort on the part of the
manufacturer, while serving essential functions in a safety
regulatory scheme. The general controls that are applicable
to MESs are examined in the following section.
The purpose of the registration requirement is to ensure
that manufacturers are legitimate and are accountable for
their defective products. Reporting of adverse effects allows a
product to be tracked and enables the FDA to make a rapid
243. See Adler, supra note 140, at 512; Benson et al., supra note 110, at 497.
244. See Adler, supra note 140, at 512; Benson et al., supra note 110, at 497.
245. See Adler, supra note 140, at 512 n.9; Benson et al., supra note 110, at
497.
246. See Adler, supra note 140, at 512 n.9. Technically, the labeling requirement is not a general control requirement. This requirement is mandatory for
all medical products, however, regardless of their classifications. 2 O'REILLY,
supra note 136, § 18.10. For the sake of convenience, labeling is treated as a
general control requirement in this comment.
247. See Benson et al., supra note 110, at 497. Likewise, adulteration and
misbranding are not general control requirements, but these provisions are
mandatory for all medical products regardless of their classifications. 2
O'REILLY, supra note 136, §§ 18.11-12. For the sake of convenience, they are
treated as general control requirements in this comment.
248. See Adler, supra note 140, at 512; Benson et al., supra note 110, at 497.
249. See Adler, supra note 140, at 513; Benson et al., supra note 110, at 497.
250. See Adler, supra note 140, at 513; Benson et al., supra note 110, at 497.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 173-174.
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recall when a device is defective. Device misbranding covers
a number of violations, including the failure to include required information on the packages, such as the name and
place of business of the manufacturer.25 2 Other misbranding
violations include inadequate directions and warnings.2 53
The manufacturers of expert systems have a duty to warn of
any potential dangers caused by their products.25 4 Because
this is standard for any manufacturer, the FDA's labeling
and misbranding requirements do not necessarily pose any
undue burden on the manufacturers of MESs. Moreover, the
labeling and misbranding requirements are crucial in communicating to users the limitations and risks of MESs.
On the other hand, the burden-benefit balance shows
that MESs should be exempted from the device adulteration
provisions. Device adulteration includes prohibitions against
"filthy and decomposed products or materials; [u]nsanitary
storage, packing or manufacturing conditions for devices; use
of poisonous or deleterious containers for a device; or use of
an unsafe color additive in a device."255 These device adulteration prohibitions describe the unsanitary conditions that
would make hardware devices unfit for medical purposes.
While sanitary conditions are critical to hardware devices,
they are not critical to medical expert systems. MESs are
computer software programs, and their use does not require
them to come into physical contact with the user. For this
reason, MESs should be exempted from the adulteration
provisions.
Likewise, GMPs are designed to prevent shoddy manufacturing practices. As such, GMPs cover areas of "manufacturing and quality control"256 including "organization and
personnel, buildings, equipment, component control, production controls . . . and product inspection."257 These quality
management practices indicate that GMPs apply mainly to
medical devices that are produced in manufacturing
processes. Since MESs are computer software, there is no
manufacturing process involved in their creation. For this
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

See 2 'REILLY, supra note 136, § 18.12.
2 id.
3 AMERIAN LAW, supra note 70, § 32:15.
2 'REILLY, supra note 136, § 18.11.
2 id. § 18.15.
2 id.

1994]

MEDICAL EXPERT SYSTEMS

1225

reason, the current GMPs generally are not applicable to
MESs.
Nevertheless, quality management practices that are
pertinent to processes other than the manufacturing process
remain applicable to MESs. For instance, the GMP requirement for record-keeping may be applicable to MESs. This
part of the GMP requires the manufacturer to keep "distribution records, finished product failure investigation, master
record of specifications and procedures, device history, and
complaint files." 258 Given the complexity and size of MESs,

record-keeping requirements are important to MESs, because
they provide a paper trail that allows software errors to be
found and corrected quickly. Without such documentation,
information may be forgotten or lost over the years, especially
in light of the personnel changes software companies often
experience. As a result, MES developers may not be able to
track design changes effectively, and ultimately may not be
able to evaluate and correct software defects in a responsive
manner.
Thus, the concept of quality management remains applicable to MESs despite their intangible nature. 25 9 Alternate

quality management practices need to be developed, however,
to better assure the quality of MESs. When developing these
alternate quality management practices, emphasis should be
placed on those that focus on the planning stage of software

development. 260 For example, a master quality plan that in-

cludes provisions for every stage of work could be put together prior to starting development.2 6 ' To enhance their effectiveness, these provisions should provide concrete
requirements and standards of quality processes (e.g., design
reviews, testing, and document control) to ensure that
adopted development approaches are actually carried out and
that resulting products are acceptable.26 2 In essence, such a
258. 2 id.
259. See KEvIN DAILY, QuALITY MANAGEMENT FOR SOFTWARE 7 (1992). The
emergence of software quality management as a crucial component of software
development is clearly demonstrated by the numerous books recently written

on this topic. See,

e.g., WILLIAM L. BRYAN & STANLEY G. SIEGEL, SOFTWARE

(1988); HANDBOOK OF So'rWARE QuALiTY
Gordon Schulmeyer & James I. McManus eds., 2d ed. 1992).
260. See DAILY, supra note 259, at 6.
261. See id.
262. See id.
PRODUCT ASSURANCE

ASSURANCE

(G.
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plan provides the quality assurance framework and serves to
ensure a common understanding of quality policies and procedures. This understanding is important in raising the
quality-consciousness of the people involved in the development process.
2.

Performance Standards

Given their risks, MESs might conceivably be classified
as Class II devices. In that case, in addition to general controls, MESs would be required to comply with a performance
standard set by the FDA.2 6 3 A performance standard is
designed to assure that similar devices perform safely and effectively.2 6 4 The performance standards that the FDA has
imposed on Class II devices include "construction; components; ingredients; properties, and/or compatibility with
power systems." 265 These standards, however, apply primarily to hardware devices. For example, the FDA may promulgate a standard requiring manufacturers of hearing-aid devices to make their products from a material that is nonallergic to humans, or that the amplified sound level be limited so as not to cause damage to the user's hearing. These
standards are not applicable to MESs because of the less tangible nature of computer software. The FDA must develop a
performance standard that is applicable to computer software
in order to classify medical expert systems as Class II devices. Standardized performance testing provides an example of a performance standard that applies to computer
software because testing is an effective quality control
method for computer software.2 6 6 In fact, the computer
software industry normally tests programs extensively prior
to releasing them into the market.2 6 7 In the case of MESs,
standardized performance tests may be designed to include
safety and effectiveness criteria. Thus, in the event that
MESs are classified as Class II devices, the FDA should propose standardized performance tests for safety and effectiveness, and then require MESs to pass these tests prior to allowing the software to be marketed.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

See Adler, supra note 140, at 513; Benson et al., supra note 110, at 497.
See 2 O'REILLY, supra note 136, § 18.06.
2 id.
See Reid, supra note 185, at 22.
See Bulchis & Pirio, supra note 198, at 1.
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3. Pre-Market Approval
In the event the FDA considers MESs to be very highrisk devices and classifies them as Class III, MESs must go
through a pre-market approval process (PMA).2 68 Pre-market approval is a process that requires the manufacturer to
demonstrate the safety and effectiveness of the device
through actual clinical data.2 6 9 The manufacturer must first
obtain the FDA's approval to conduct a clinical study of the
device by filing an investigational device exemption (IDE).2 7 0
Filing an IDE involves submitting a draft of the study protocol and drafts of patient informed consent forms, hiring investigators, and obtaining a preliminary permit for the study
from an institutional review board. 2 7 1 The manufacturer
may begin the study only after FDA approval is secured.27 2
After the study is completed, the data gathered must be analyzed and presented to the FDA in a "statistically meaningful
way. "273 The FDA will start reviewing the PMA data only
after all the necessary information is submitted and may ask
for additional information before starting the review.2 7 4 The
FDA is required to complete the review within 180 days after
the PMA submission is complete.27 5 In reality, the review
takes about a year or slightly longer.2 7 6 When all the other
delays in a PMA process are totaled, it is possible that the
process may take a couple of years. The review is very extensive and usually involves both an outside expert panel and
the FDA's own in-depth review.2 7 Gaining PMA approval
from the FDA does not necessarily mean an end of the product approval process, because interested persons, including
competitors and public interest groups, may file a petition to
review the approval of the device.2 7 8 Gaining PMA approval
is a very involved process that adds substantial development
268. See Adler, supra note 140, at 513; Benson et al., supra note 110, at 497.
269. See Adler, supra note 140, at 513; Benson et al., supra note 110, at 497.
270. See Jonathan S. Kahan, PremarketApproval versus PremarketNotification: Different Routes to the Same Market, 39 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 510, 51213 (1984).
271. See id. at 512-13.
272. See id. at 513.
273. Id.
274. See id.
275. See id.
276. See Adler, supra note 140, at 520 & n.63.
277. Kahan, supra note 270, at 513.
278. Id. at 514.
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cost and marketing delay to a device. This may be devastating to new technologies such as MESs, where rapid advances
are often made overnight.
4.

Summary

Because the FDA's current regulatory scheme is more
applicable to hardware devices than to computer software,
some modifications are required to make this scheme applicable to MESs. While most of the general controls are important and should be adopted in the regulatory scheme for
MESs, the adulteration provision, as well as most of the GMP
provisions, are not applicable to MESs and should be excluded from this scheme. Moreover, in the event that MESs
are classified as Class II devices, a performance standard
that includes a standardized testing scheme for MESs should
be proposed by the FDA. The FDA should simplify the PMA
proceeding for MESs should the FDA decide to classify MESs
as Class III devices. Lengthy delays associated with PMA
proceedings are devastating to MES manufacturers, given
the competitive nature of the software industry.
An effective regulatory scheme will also depend on the
effectiveness and efficiency of the regulatory agency. The
FDA's effectiveness and efficiency will be discussed in the
next section.
D. Effectiveness of the FDA In Regulating Medical Devices
The FDA's effectiveness in regulating medical devices
has been questionable. Dangerous medical devices, such as
the Dalkon Shield IUDs, have slipped past the FDA. 9 More
recently, silicone-gel breast implants have received news coverage for injuries caused.28 °
A close examination of the FDA reveals that the agency
lacks the resources to meet the statutory demands of the
Medical Device Act. 28 1 For example, the FDA is required to
conduct PMA proceedings for all Class III devices that were
on the market prior to 1976.282 Moreover, the FDA is required to write performance standards for all Class II de279. Mike Kennedy, What Should Be the Penalty for Making Unsafe Products, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 6, 1994, at A18.
280. Id.
281. See Adler, supra note 140, at 514-15.
282. See id. at 514.
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vices. 28 3 As of 1987, the FDA had not completed a single
PMA proceeding for pre-1976 Class III devices or written a
single performance standard for Class II devices. 284 To compensate for the delay, many post-1976 Class II and III devices
were allowed to reach the market through a process called
"substantial equivalence."2 8 5 This loophole allows a post1976 device to be marketed if it is substantially equivalent to
a pre-1976 device. Because a great number of pre-1976 Class
III devices have not undergone PMA proceedings and practically none of the pre-1976 Class II devices are regulated to
any performance standards, the "substantial equivalence" devices are essentially unregulated.28 6 This delay by the FDA
alarmed Congress to such an extent that it passed the Safe
Medical Device Act of 1990 (SMDA), which requires that all
pre-1976 Class III devices that have not yet undergone PMA
proceedings by the end of 1995 be reclassified by the FDA
into Class I or Class 11.287 Given this deadline, the SMDA
forces the FDA to look at all pre-1976 Class III devices that
have not undergone PMA proceedings and to select those
with the highest risks for PMA proceedings. In addition to
resolving the FDA's delay in regulating pre-1976 Class III devices, the SMDA also addresses the FDA's other areas of deficiency in an effort to improve the current regulatory scheme
for medical devices.28 8
Given the FDA's track record in regulating other medical
devices, questions exist as to the effectiveness of the FDA in
regulating MESs. The FDA's lack of effectiveness may be attributed to its deficiency of resources. 28 9 Nonetheless, actions
are being taken to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of
283. See id.
284. See id.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 156-161.
286. See Adler, supra note 140, at 515-16.
287. Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4511
See also Charles J.
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360 (1990)).
Raubicheck, The FDA's Implementation of the Safe Medical Devices Act of
1990, 46 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 885, 887-88 (1991).
288. See Raubicheck, supra note 287 at 885. Other deficient areas of the
FDA addressed by the SMDA include post-market surveillance, product approval, and enforcement. Id. These improvements serve to strengthen the
FDA's recall and enforcement authority. Additionally, approval is made easier
by allowing medical device manufacturers to use some clinical data from prior
PMA proceedings to meet the data submission requirement in their own PMA
proceedings. Id.
289. See Adler, supra note 140, at 515.
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the FDA as demonstrated by the SMDA. In the interim, alternate regulatory schemes that relieve the FDA of its current burden should be explored.
V.

PROPOSAL

The conflicting issues facing the FDA in the regulation of
MESs require the FDA to perform a balancing act. On one
hand, protecting the public health and safety is of paramount
concern. On the other hand, encouraging innovative beneficial medical devices is also a significant objective. Until now,
the FDA was able to balance these two conflicting objectives
in regulating MESs. The FDA was reasonably successful because it adopted the philosophy that the amount of regulation
imposed should depend on the device's risks and benefits.29 °
So far, MESs are available to patients through the intervention of physicians. Physicians, having undergone extensive
formal training, possess the necessary medical knowledge to
determine whether the advice given by the MES is accurate.
For this reason, the current risks inherent in MESs are minimal. As such, there is no need to regulate these systems.
This current agency position is stated in the
Draft FDA Policy
29 1
on the Regulation of Computer Products.

As MESs become more widely used and physician intervention is reduced, however, the risks inherent in these systems may become significant. Consequently, more regulation
for MESs will be required. As such, the goal of protecting the
public health and safety, while at the same time encouraging
innovation, becomes difficult to achieve. Given the current
regulatory scheme for medical devices, which is hardwareoriented, some modifications are necessary to make the
scheme more applicable to computer software products, such
as MESs. Some of the recommended modifications include
replacing the current GMP with software quality management practices that are more applicable to MESs, and insti290. This policy is clearly demonstrated in the overall regulatory scheme for
medical devices. See supra text accompanying notes 140-180. In short, medical
devices are classified and regulated according to the device's risks. See Adler,
supra note 140, at 512; Benson et al., supra note 110, at 497. Apparently, this
policy was also adopted for MESs, as indicated by the FDA's current position of
not imposing any regulation on MESs that require human intervention. See
Draft Policy, supra note 163, at 3.
291. See Draft Policy, supra note 163, at 3; see also supra text accompanying
notes 163-181.
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tuting standardized testing for MESs prior to marketing.
While the current GMPs are applicable to hardware devices,
they are not suitable to software devices such as MESs. To
the contrary, standardized testing involves subjecting all
MESs to a standardized performance test to evaluate
whether the performance and safety of these systems is acceptable prior to marketing. Standardized testing is important in regulating MESs, because testing is one of the few
effective forms of quality control for software products. Furthermore, standardized testing helps prevent shoddy and
misleading testing practices by the software developers. Finally, standardized testing may eliminate the need for medical expert systems to undergo exceedingly costly and lengthy
PMA proceedings.
Aside from the current, more product-oriented FDA regulatory scheme, other regulatory schemes may also be suitable
to medical expert systems. Since these alternative schemes
do not focus on the manufacturing process, they do not subject the manufacturers of MESs to additional product development costs or lengthy delays. As a result, the initial investment required in the development of MESs is reduced,
making MESs even more attractive to investors. One such
method is to adopt the professional licensing scheme currently imposed by the states on a number of professions. In
the case of MESs, licensing should be required for some key
members of the development team. For example, the person
who contributes medical information to the knowledge base
could be required to be a licensed physician who is a known
authority in that particular medical area.2 9 2 Additionally,
the person who develops the rules for the inference engine
could be required to have some formal training in the particular area of medicine for which the MES is designed. The rationale for imposing this professional licensing scheme is to
ensure that key members of the development team satisfy a
minimum competence level. Moreover, the licensing scheme
also affords the government the opportunity to impress MES
developers with important issues, such as professional ethics
and social responsibility. For high-risk devices such as
MESs, the fear of losing licenses may be the needed incentive
that prompts MES developers to adopt extra safety measures
292. See Gerstner, supra note 56, at 264.
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to eliminate the unnecessary risks of injury. While this licensing scheme may bar some professionals from entering
the MES industry, thus narrowing the pool of qualified applicants, it seems a fairly small price to pay for quality and
safety in an emerging technology.
Another method that may be adopted to minimize the
risks of MESs is to require potential users to attend training
sessions conducted by the manufacturer prior to use of a medical expert system. Training sessions are likely to help users
become more familiar with MESs by teaching them the basic
operating principles of MESs. More importantly, training
sessions should be used to emphasize the limitations of
MESs. The inherent risks and dangers of relying on MESs to
diagnose a disease, without consulting a medical physician,
should also be stressed. A telephone hot-line should be available to the users for questions regarding the use and operation of the system. Given the complexity of MESs, educating
users is important to reduce potential misuse and injuries,
since "'people trained to meet risks that they understand can
cope with them reliably.' "293 Although education is not a
fool-proof method, it provides an additional safety measure
for users of MESs without imposing any added product development burden that may escalate development costs and delay release of the systems into the stream of commerce. Any
costs involved in conducting these training sessions may be
passed on to MES users as part of the ancillary service
contract.
Since the professional licensing and training schemes
may be carried out by outside groups, these schemes will relieve the FDA of some of its tremendous burden. With respect to the regulatory licensing scheme, the FDA could reserve the right to make policy decisions while leaving the
day-to-day operations and enforcement to a professional organization such as the American Medical Association. Similarly, with respect to the regulatory training scheme, the
FDA could provide the training guidelines and leave their execution to the MES manufacturers.

293. KEETON ET AL., supranote 59, at 11 (quoting Corwin Edwards, Professor
of Economics of the University of Oregon).
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CONCLUSION

Advances in computer technology have created an advanced form of informational technology called MES. While
MESs may one day replace physicians in diagnosing diseases,
they may also cause injuries to the user by giving an inaccurate diagnosis. The FDA has classified MESs as medical devices and has considered imposing regulation on MESs.
While regulation protects the public safety by ensuring that
MESs are safe and effective, regulation may also stifle innovations in a field where rapid advancements are made almost
daily.
This comment determined that product liability law
alone is inadequate to ensure the safety of MESs and fails to
protect the interests of injured MES users. Moreover, it concluded that regulatory controls for MESs are necessary, especially when MESs become more widely available.
The current FDA regulatory scheme for medical devices
is more applicable to medical hardware than to computer
software, and some modifications were proposed to make it
better suited for MESs. One of the main modifications proposed involves standardized performance testing for MESs.
Because the current regulatory scheme is known to cause
lengthy delays and added development costs, alternative regulatory schemes were proposed to alleviate these problems.
An alternative scheme suggests the creation of a developer
licensing requirement to ensure that some members of the
MES development team meet minimum levels of competence.
Another alternative scheme proposes that all MES users be
given training prior to using an MES. While it may not completely prevent injuries related to the use of MESs, education
certainly provides an additional safety measure for MES
users.
Frank D. Nguyen

